Joseph Shine v. Union of India: Striking Down Adultery as a Crime in Modern India

-

Joseph Shine v. Union of India: Striking Down Adultery as a Crime in Modern India

In a landmark judgment delivered on 27 September 2018, the Supreme Court of India unanimously struck down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), declaring them unconstitutional. This decision marked a pivotal moment in India’s journey toward gender equality, privacy, and personal autonomy.


The Legal Challenge

Petitioner Joseph Shine filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the colonial-era adultery law. The law criminalised a man for having consensual sexual relations with a married woman without her husband’s consent. Notably, the woman was not considered an offender, and only the husband could file a complaint.


The petition raised three key questions:

1. Does Section 497 IPC violate Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution?

2. Is Section 198(2) CrPC discriminatory for allowing only husbands to prosecute?

3. Should adultery be made gender-neutral?



The Court’s Verdict

The five-judge Constitution Bench, comprising Chief Justice Dipak Misra, and Justices Nariman, Khanwilkar, Chandrachud, and Malhotra, unanimously held that:


• Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional as it violates the right to equality (Article 14), prohibits discrimination based on sex (Article 15), and infringes on personal liberty and privacy (Article 21).

• Section 198(2) CrPC, which restricted the right to prosecute to husbands alone, was also struck down as unconstitutional when read with Section 497.



Key Takeaways from the Judgment

1. Equality and Non-Discrimination

The Court found that the law treated women as the property of their husbands, denying them agency and autonomy. It failed the test of equality and was inherently discriminatory.


“The provision is archaic and paternalistic, rooted in the idea that a woman loses her individuality upon marriage.” - Justice Chandrachud


2. No Justification under Article 15(3)

The Union of India argued that the law protected women under Article 15(3). The Court rejected this, stating that true protection must empower not infantilize women.


3. Privacy and Sexual Autonomy

Building on the landmark Puttaswamy privacy judgment, the Court held that consensual relationships between adults fall within the private domain. Criminalizing adultery intrudes into this space without compelling public interest.


4. Adultery won’t equal to Criminal Offence

While adultery may be a moral wrong or a civil ground for divorce, it does not warrant criminal punishment. The Court refused to make the law gender-neutral, emphasizing that criminal law should not regulate private morality.


Domain and Effect

Criminal Law - Limits the scope of criminalization to public harm, not private morality.

Gender Justice - Advances feminist constitutionalism and dismantles patriarchal norms.

Privacy Jurisprudence - Reinforces sexual autonomy and decisional privacy.

Constitutional Values - Embraces dynamic interpretation aligned with evolving societal norms. 


So there for in Joseph Shine v. Union of India is more than a judgment it’s a constitutional affirmation of dignity, equality, and liberty. It reflects a judiciary willing to shed colonial baggage and embrace progressive values rooted in the Constitution.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Understanding Transfer Petitions Before the Supreme Court: Section 25 CPC and Article 139A of the Constitution

-
Understanding Transfer Petitions Before the Supreme Court: Section 25 CPC and Article 139A of the Constitution   In the complex landscape of Indian litigation, transfer petitions serve as a vital procedural tool to ensure justice, convenience, and judicial efficiency. Whether it’s a matrimonial dispute, a constitutional challenge, or a multi-jurisdictional commercial suit, the Supreme Court of India has the power to transfer cases across courts under various provisions. This blog unpacks the three principal legal routes for transfer petitions before the Supreme Court: Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Article 139A (1) of the Constitution of India Article 139A (2) of the Constitution of India We also clarify the court fee structure , which varies depending on whether the matter is matrimonial or not.     1. Transfer Petition Under Section 25 CPC Statutory Basis: Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of Indi...
Read more

Varshatai v. State of Maharashtra (2025 INSC 486)

-
  Varshatai v. State of Maharashtra (2025 INSC 486) Date of Judgment: 15 April 2025 Bench: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Krishnan V. Chandran Legal Question Does the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022 prohibit the use of Urdu as an additional language on a Municipal Council building’s signboard? Case Background The Municipal Council of Patur , Akola district , displayed its name in both Marathi and Urdu. The appellant objected, arguing that only Marathi, being the official language of Maharashtra, could be used. The Collector initially upheld the objection, but the Divisional Commissioner reversed it. The appellant then approached the Bombay High Court , which declined to interfere. During the appeal, the 2022 Act came into force. The High Court re-heard the matter and ruled that the Act did not prohibit the use of Urdu. The appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court . Supreme Court’s Decision The Supreme Court...
Read more

St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr Versus Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors.

-
St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr Versus Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors. Number of judges: 2 Name of the judges: Aniruddha Bose and J.B.Pardiwala 1.        BRIEF FACTS: Sh. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava was the principal in a minority school whose services was terminated by the school management on ground of indiscipline. Sh. Rajendra Prasad preferred a writ petition before Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh against the termination order under Article 226 of Constitution. Hon’ble Single Judge dismissed the petition with the contention that the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 against a private institution. Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 485/2017 held a contrary view that writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. The matter reached to Hon’ble Supreme Court of India where Hon’ble SCI held that as the school is not an ‘state’ under Article 12 of the Consti...
Read more